HOUSING AND SECTION 1982: THE ADVISABILITY
OF EXTENDING THE STATUTORY MANDATE
BEYOND ACTS OF TRADITIONAL
DISCRIMINATION
Ever since the Supreme Courts landmark decision in Jones v- Alfred H. Mayer Co.,' commentators have puzzled over the scope of the
thirteenth amendment, both as to the rights it confers and the protec-

tion it affords those rights by the various federal statutes enacted pursuant to it.'

While Jones on its facts held merely that the thirteenth

amendment, as implemented by section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act,'
forbids private sellers of real property to refuse to deal with otherwise
qualified purchasers solely on the basis of race,4 the opinion indicated
both that section 1982 would be construed liberally in the future5 and
that Congress would be given wide latitude in drafting additional legislation designed to eliminate the "badges and incidents of slavery"
which the amendment proscribes. 6
This Note will deal with the judicial gloss which has been put upon
section 1982 by two recent circuit court decisions involving housing discrimination, Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.,7 a Seventh Circuit decision, and Love v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc.,8 decided by the Fifth Circuit.
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Note, Discriminatory Housing Markets, Racial Unconscionability, and Section
1988: The Contract Buyers League Case, 80 YALE L.J 516 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Contract Buyers].
1. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
2. See, e.g., Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom Revisited: Some
First Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 22 RurrERs L. REv. 537 (1968);
Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the FederalAnti-Discrimination
Laws, 69 CoLuM. L. Rlv. 1019, 1023-27 (1969); Note, The New Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1294 (1969).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
4. 392 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1968). See text accompanying notes 35-38 infra.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 439-44. In Jones the Supreme Court expressly declined to discuss the extent to which the thirteenth amendments self-executing directive that "[n]either slavery
nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States" operates to protect
rights not presently guaranteed by statute. Id. at 439. One commentator has suggested
that the courts downplay the self-executing nature of the amendment and allow Congress, under authority of section two's enabling clause, "to reach more attenuated practices which have the tendency to impose the 'badges' [of slavery] that may be reached
by the courts." Note, The New Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at 1319-20.
7. 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3349 (Dec. 16, 1974).
8. 482 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Both cases addressed the issue of whether section 1982's guarantee
that all citizens "have the same right .
as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real...
property"" prohibits white real estate concerns from selling dwellings
located in predominantly black residential areas to black purchasers at
higher prices and upon more onerous terms than would be charged for
similar dwellings located in predominantly white neighborhoods. The
Seventh Circuit found a section 1982 violation; the Fifth did not. It
is the thesis of this Note that the reasoning in neither case necessarily
follows from the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Jones, and in addition, that the Seventh Circuit's expansive construction of the statute
may have been ill-advised strictly from the standpoint of providing a
practicable and even-handed remedy against the proscribed behavior
for all subsequent owners of the properties involved.
Clark and Love: Conflicting Conclusions From Similar Fact Situations
Clark is the second' ° appeal from a district court's disposition of
issues arising from the Contract Buyers League litigation centered in
the Chicago area." Suit was initiated by a class of black purchasers
of newly constructed residences against the builders of the homes and
various realty concerns which had actually sold them.' 2 As explained
by the court in Clark, the plaintiffs' theory for recovery was based on
the allegation
that as a result of intense racial discrimination in Chicago and its
metropolitan area there existed at all pertinent times a housing market
for whites and a separate housing market for blacks, the latter confined to a relatively small geographical area in the central city. Plaintiffs contended that the demand among blacks for housing greatly ex9. 42 US.C. § 1982 (1970).
10. The first appeal was taken from the district court decisions in Clark and Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969)-a companion
case to Clark discussed in notes 12 & 32 infra. The appeal dealt with the running of
the limitations period applicable to the alleged claims, and the lower court's holding in
favor of the respective plaintiff classes was affirmed. Baker v. F & F Inv., 420 F.2d
1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
11. See citations to Chicago newspaper articles covering the events leading up to
and immediately following the instigation of the Contract Buyers League class action
in Note, Contract Buyers 521 n.12.
12. 501 F.2d at 327. The first class action instituted by the League, Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ii. 1969), was brought by
a class of black purchasers of used residential property against their sellers and the sellers' mortgagees. For an edited copy of the Contract Buyers League complaint, see S.
PLAoER, NEW APPROACHES IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY 112-25 (1970).

The district

court, while holding that the plaintiff class had stated a valid section 1982 claim, nevertheless dismissed the League as a plaintiff, 300 F. Supp. at 230-32, with the result that
the case was subsequently prosecuted as Baker v. F & F Inv. See Note, Contract
Buyers 517 n.6. See note 10 supra.
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ceeded -the supply of housing available in the black market and that
the defendants exploited this situation by building houses in or adjacent to black areas and selling the houses to plaintiffs at prices far
in excess of the amounts which white persons paid for comparable residences in neighboring urban areas, and on onerous terms far less favorable than -those available to white buyers of similar properties, all in
violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments .and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.13
The novel element of the claim was that it did not allege that the
defendants had engaged in "traditional" racial discrimination of the
type involved in Jones; 4 that is, it contained no allegation that the defendants had treated, "in similar circumstances, a member or members
of one race different from the manner in which members of another
race are treated."' 5 There was no contention that the defendants had
utilized different pricing policies in dealing with prospective home buyers of similar financial means but different races. Evidently, both
black and white prospective buyers were quoted the same inflated
prices with respect to properties situated in the black housing market.
Necessarily then, the essence of plaintiffs' theory was that section 1982
does not allow the sellers of property to reap a profit from a dual housing market created by the discriminatory conduct of others.18
Chief Judge Swygert, writing for the Seventh Circuit, saw no difficulty in imposing liability under these circumstances; for him, the extrapolation from Jones to Clark was easy. Building upon the Supreme
Court's admonition in Jones that section 1982 is designed "to assure
that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as
a dollar in the hands of a white man,"'17 he dismissed the defendants'
contention that their failure to discriminate in the traditional sense insulated them from section 1982 liability with the statement that it ignored "current realities of racial psychology and economic practicalities.""' Liability was held to turn on whether defendants' course of con13. 501 F.2d at 327.
14. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
15. 501 F.2d at 336, citing Love v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc., 482 F.2d 613, 615 (5th
Cir. 1973).
16. The Clark opinion does not specify what relief the plaintiff class was seeking,
but the close interrelationship between Clark and the Contract Buyers League case implies that the relief sought in the latter-rescission or reformation of the installment
land contracts under which plaintiffs' homes were purchased, plus actual and punitive
damages, see S. PLAGm, supra note 12, at 124-25-was sought in Clark as well.
17. 501 F.2d at 330, citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443

(1968).
18. 501 F.2d at 331. Chief Judge Swygert also expressed agreement with the conclusion of District Judge Will that "there cannot in this country be markets or profits
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duct resulted in perpetuating residential segregation, regardless of
whether blacks and whites similarly situated were actually treated differently.' 9 The court held that when the differential in price and terms
between comparable housing units in the black and white markets exceeds the bounds of "reasonableness," a prima facie claim has been
stated under the statute.2 °
As an alternate basis for its decision in favor of the plaintiff class,
the court held that the evidence offered was also sufficient to make
out a prima facie case of traditional racial discimination. 2 ' In the
court's view, the traditional definition of discrimination (unequal treatment of parties similarly situated) was satisfied because three corporations controlled by the defendants were shown to have sold housing
roughly comparable to plaintiffs' property to white market buyers at
lower prices than plaintiffs were paying.2" Whether even this type of
conduct can properly be said to constitute discrimination in the traditional sense is, however, a difficult question.2 3
The factual allegations advanced before the Fifth Circuit in Love
v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc. 24 closely parallel those of the Clark complaint.
A plaintiff class composed of installment purchasers of homes in a subdivision sued the developer of the subdivision and two mortgage lenders for exploiting a market structure tainted by racial discrimination in
violation of section 1982.25 Again, there was no allegation of traditional discrimination on the part of any of the defendants.2 6 However,
subsequent hearings in the Love case revealed a significant distinction
between the fact situation there presented and the situation established by the plaintiffs in Clark. The Clark defendants were shown
to have charged purchasers of comparable white market housing lower
prices than those imposed upon purchasers in black areas. But in Love
based on the color of a man's skin." Id. at 332, citing Contract Buyers League v. F
& F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1969). However, a distinction can be drawn
between the theories under which the two judges decided in favor of the respective plaintiff classes. See note 32 infra.
19. 501 F.2d at 330-33.
20. Id. at 334.
21. Id. at 336.
22. Id. at 336-39.
23. See text accompanying note 31 infra.
24. 482 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1973).
25. Id. at 613. However, a notable difference between the defendant home builders
in Clark and Love is that the former absolutely refused to sell property in the black
market except through allegedly onerous installment contracts, 501 F.2d at 335-36, while
the latter would engage in more conventional financing if the buyer could personally
qualify for a mortgage loan, 482 F.2d at 615.
26. 482 F.2d at 614.
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the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendant home builder, or indeed any other home builder in the Dade County, Florida metropolitan
area, had sold homes to the white residential market which were sufficiently comparable to their own that they could serve as the basis for
27
a charge of disparate treatment as to price.
Aside from the evidentiary differences between Clark and Love,
Judge Belt of the Fifth Circuit took a somewhat more restrictive view
of the scope of section 1982 than did Chief Judge Swygert. His opinion was grounded upon the assumption that the statute, "although applicable to private persons under Jones v. Mayer, . . nevertheless
rests on an equal protection premise .
,28 Acknowledging that
equal protection concepts clearly proscribe racial discrimination in the
traditional sense, the court concluded that a demonstration of such discrimination in the case before it would require a showing that the defendants themselves constructed and sold homes similar to plaintiffs'
in the white market at lower prices and upon more favorable terms. 9
Plaintiffs' attempt to do so failed because the white subdivision developed by the defendants which plaintiffs sought to compare with their
own was comprised of more expensive dwellings and was designed to
appeal to a different class of home buyers so that the prices and terms
exacted for the two classes of housing could not fairly be compared.30
Since the defendant was not selling similar residential property in the
white market, discriminatory pricing could not be proved.
An important observation should be made with respect to the
court's definition of traditional racial discrimination in Love, the same
definition employed as the basis for the alternative holding in Clark.3 1
Presumably the court deemed prospective home buyers in either the
black or white housing markets to be "similarly situated," so that a developer's imposition of higher prices and more burdensome terms upon
buyers in one market than those imposed upon buyers in another would
constitute a prohibited discrimination. A strong argument can be
made, however, that prospective home buyers who, for whatever reason, are limited to shopping in one of two fairly distinct housing markets are not in fact "similarly situated" to buyers who must shop in the
other, and should not be so considered for 1urposes of applying the
traditional formula. The label "traditional" discrimination should perhaps be reserved for instances in which sellers deal differently with
*...

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 615-16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 616.
at 615-16.
at 615.
text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
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prospective buyers in the same housing market. Therefore, for the re-

mainder of this Note, the definition of traditional discrimination formulated by the Fifth Circuit to govern its adjudication of the Love case
and reapplied in the Clark alternative holding will be referred to as

"quasi-traditional" discrimination.
The Love plaintiffs also advanced the theory that a developer of
black market housing who does no business in the white market nevertheless violates section 1982 if it can be shown that the prices and terms
he imioses upon his black market purchasers are substantially more
burdensome than those which he probably would impose upon purchasers of comparable white market housing, were he selling in that mar-

ket.8 2 The Fifth Circuit avoided an in-depth discussion of this theory
as a result of the plaintiffs' failure to prove that other developers sold
comparable white market housing upon less onerous terms. 3 With no
factual basis for a prediction as to what the defendants' probable business conduct would be if they built for the white market, the court
had no choice but to affirm the grant of summary judgment in defendants' favor. It can be argued that proof of such a black-white market
differential will be all but impossible in most cases because the black
and white markets are comprised of types of housing which are fundamentally incomparable, and that the Fifth Circuit's holding in Love

therefore amounts to predicating liability upon proof of racial discrimination under the traditional or quasi-traditional theories.34 For purposes
32. Id. at 616. The basis for this contention was the decision in Contract Buyers
League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969). While Contract Buyers
League, like Clark, rejected the proposition that traditional racial discrimination must
be alleged to state a section 1982 claim, the opinion by Judge Will suggests that he was
attempting to construct a variation upon the quasi-traditional formula rather than disregarding both the traditional and quasi-traditional standards entirely. Under the Clark
approach, a home builder automatically incurs liability if he sells black market housing
at prices unreasonably higher than those being charged by other developers for comparable white market housing. There is no inquiry into the price he would have exacted
for such housing if he built for the white market. In contrast, Judge Will seemed to
propose the standard alluded to by the Fifth Circuit in Love, i.e., that evidence of prices
charged by other developers is primarily relevant as an indication of defendant's probable pricing behavior were it doing business in the white market. This approach is
closer to the quasi-traditional theory than the rule enunciated in Clark in that it emphasizes one party's differential treatment, albeit probable differential treatment, among at
least arguably similarly situated persons. But see text following note 31 supra (discussion of meaning of "parties similarly situated"). For a more detailed analysis of the
theoretical distinction between Contract Buyers League and Clark, see Note, Contract
Buyers 523 n.17.
33. 482 F.2d at 616.
34. See Note, Discrimination in Housing Under Section 1982, 5 ToLEDo L. Rnv.
353, 363 (1974). The difficulty of computing a "white price" for a given segment of
housing units in the black market i; discussed in Note, ContractBuyers 524 n.18.
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of analysis, that will be the view taken of Love in the remainder of
this Note.
Jones, "Traditional"Racial Discrimination,and the Rules of
Clark and Love
A brief overview of Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Jones
makes it clear that the case does not compel the result reached in
Clark. Jones involved a simple refusal to sell a home to an otherwise
qualified black purchaser because of his race;35 the challenged behavior constituted no less than traditional racial discrimination. The Court
carefully limited its holding so as not to encompass "discrimination in
financing arrangements ....
-36 The only real encouragement offered
by Jones to the Clark plaintiffs was its sweeping statements that section
1982 secures "the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the
right to live wherever a white man can live,"3 7 and that the statute was
intended "to assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase
the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man."38
Assuming the truth of the Clark defendants' assertion that they
would have charged white buyers of black market residential property
the same prices imposed upon black purchasers and imposed similar
financing terms, 39 it is difficult to see how this broad language prohibits
them from functioning within a dual market structure which they did
not create. The black man's dollar does go as far as the white man's
dollar toward the purchase of any of defendants' homes-the problem
is that the discriminatory acts of third persons reduce the purchasing
power of dollars in both black and white hands when the desired dwelling is part of the black market. Furthermore, the developers' conduct
did not restrict black purchasers' freedom to buy homes and live wherever they chose in respect to properties which the developers owned.
Had the black plaintiffs desired to purchase white market homes of
comparable quality to those which they eventually bought in the black
35. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.

36. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
37. Id. at 443, cited in Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 330 (7th
Cir. 1974).
38. 392 U.S. at 443.
39. Acceptance of the Clark developers as totally pristine vis-a-vis attempts to shape

the racial composition of the neighborhoods in which they sold residential housing is
made more difficult in view of the fact that the defendants in the related Contract Buy-

ers League case were charged with having acquired the properties resold to plaintiffs
through the technique of "blockbusting," now prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970). However, in Clark there was no allegation that the defendants engaged in "neighborhood shaping" activities. See notes 80-82 infra and accompanying text.
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market, defendants could not have refused to sell for racial reasons nor
exacted more than white market prices and terms. 40 Those members
of the class of home buyers in Clark who were aware of opportunities

to buy in the white market nevertheless chose to purchase from among
defendants' black market properties, presumably preferring to live with
members of their own race in spite of the accompanying economic disadvantages. Undoubtedly, their reluctance to attempt to break into
white neighborhoods, either as individuals or en masse, resulted in part
from fear of hostile reactions by white neighbors. However, it is difficult to believe that they were not also motivated, at least in part, by
the desire to reside in a more or less racially homogeneous environment. 41 This affirmation of the status quo, which in part caused the

economic distortions challenged in Clark, must to some degree mitigate
the objectionable element of the defendants' conduct.
The Seventh Circuit's answer to these objections was that any con-

duct which perpetuates residential segregation, and its resultant economic hardships, is the target of section 1982;42 and indeed, it is almost
impossible to contend that exploitation of the type practiced by the

Clark defendants does not have that effect. However, the court may
40. Conduct of this type would be actionable as traditional discrimination under section 1982. Also available would be claims based on two basic provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (b) (1970), which prohibit, respectively, discriminatory refusals to deal with and the imposition of discriminatory terms in connection with the sale of dwellings. See note 83 infra.
41. This "reluctance to disperse" is recognized in Silverman, Homeownership for the
Poor: Subsidies and Racial Segregation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 72, 83-84 (1973). Economists have disagreed about the degree to which the dual market system is perpetuated
by a "self-segregating" impulse among blacks. At least one study has attributed the
tendency of the black urban population to congregate in old, low quality housing to their
generally lower income level and to the numerous barriers, economic and otherwise,
which preclude their entry into the white market. See Straszheim, Housing Market Discrinination and Black Housing Consumption, 88 QJ. ECON. 19, 21 (1974). However,
Professor Straszheim cites two studies which concluded that the self-segregating impulse
was a primary factor behind black housing consumption patterns: R. MuTH, Crnas AND
HousiNG 237-40, 284-303 (1969) and Olsen, A Competitive Theory of the Housing
Market, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 612-22 (1969).
It should be recognized that even if one accepts Professor Straszheim's conclusions,
they would not fully explain the failure of blacks to break into the white market once
the market barriers to which he refers have disintegrated either wholly or in substantial
part. In Clark, for example, the evidence suggested that at least some of the plaintiffs
could have purchased from the defendants white market housing comparable to that
which they eventually bought in the black market, and probably at lower prices. The
situation was probably different in Love, however; there the plaintiffs were unable to
prove that the defendant builder or any other construction companies in the area had
built white market housing substantially similar to their own. Thus, their choice to buy
in the black market does not carry with it the implication that they were willing to pay
a premium to move into a racially uniform neighborhood.
42. 501 F.2d at 330.
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have been imposing upon the admittedly flexible langauge of the statute its own conception of the types of conduct which Congress could,
but has not yet seen fit to, prohibit through the thirteenth amendment's
enabling clause.43 A true understanding of the scope of the Clark
holding comes with the realization that when Chief Judge Swygert
stated as a rule of law that "neither prices nor profits-whether derived
through well-intentioned, good-faith efforts or predatory and unethical
practices-may reflect or perpetuate discrimination against black citizens," 44 he, in effect, created a new type of "enterprise liability" which
must be borne by all dealers in real property which form part of the
black market in the Chicago metropolitan area. 5 Even if the court's
standard of liability- "reasonableness" of price and terms in the black
market as compared to those prevailing in the white market for similar
housing4 6-- proves to be a workable one, 47 there is a substantial danger
that the new business risk imposed by Clark will drive present and future real property dealers out of the black market, further restricting
the supply of housing available to black purchasers. Even assuming
that those developers who remain in the black market will comply with
the Clark ruling and exact from their buyers prices and terms roughly
similar to those imposed upon similarly situated white market purchasers, the overall decrease in the amount of low cost residential housing
brought about by the departure of marginal developers could well outweigh any advantages accruing to those prospective purchasers fortunate enough to find affordable residences. Viewed from the standpoint of public policy, the court might have been better advised to let
Congress fashion a remedy with such inevitably far reaching effects.
The argument in favor of judicial moderation is strengthened by
the fact that the result sought in Clark is compelled by neither Jones
and its progeny 43 nor, in all likelihood, the legislative history of section
1982.49 There is no doubt that a contemporary Congress could reach
43. See note 6 supra.
44. Id. at 332.
45. See Note, Contract Buyers 564 n.156 (critique of this strict liability approach
based on prices and terms charged for comparable housing in white market).
46. 501 F.2d at 333.
47. See Note, ContractBuyers 524 n.18.
48. E.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973);
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
49. It is almost inconceivable that the drafters of the statute intended its effect to
extend beyond acts of traditional racial discrimination. As observed by Justice Harlan,
dissenting in Jones, "[m]any of the legislators who took part in the congressional debates inevitably must have shared the individualistic ethic of their time, which emphasized personal freedom and embodied a distaste for governmental interference ......
392 U.S. at 473.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1975:781

the activities of the Clark defendants through the thirteenth amendment's enabling clause.5 0 But to hold that the provisions of a statute
originally passed in 1866,51 or, sub silentio, those of the thirteenth
amendment itself, proscribe behavior not constituting racial discrimination in the traditional sense may prove to be an unwise incursion upon
the legislative domain.
All of this may seem to support the legal standard enunciated by
the Fifth Circuit in Love. The Love court deviated from the traditional theory to formulate a quasi-traditional form of discrimination under which the defendant developer incurs liability if he builds comparable housing for both the black and white markets and imposes different prices and terms upon buyers in each market. But he escapes liability if he builds only for the black market, regardless of the prices
and terms he imposes upon his black purchasers as compared to those
imposed by developers of comparable housing in the white market.5"
In other words, all the developer need do to avoid section 1982 is confine his operations to the black market or, as in Love, build houses
in the white market which are not "fit subjects for comparison" because
they are "not in similar markets costwise or with the differences attendant in . . . marginal risk financing. . .. ,,53 Clearly this result cannot be sanctioned, as "[i]t would mean that the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
which was created to be an instrument for the abolition of discrimination, allows an injustice so long as it is visited exclusively on negroes."54
Fortunately, in determining the proper scope of section 1982 the
courts are not limited to a choice between the shotgun construction
adopted by the Clark court and the unevenhanded quasi-traditional
theory advanced in Love. The other alternative is to restrict the statute's coverage to conduct which is strictly classifiable as traditional discrimination. True traditional discrimination in the context of a ClarkLove type suit entails disparate treatment of prospective buyers in the
same housing market, since buyers in different markets are not in fact
"similarly situated." Under the traditional approach, a developer who
50. Id. at 438-44. Three federal courts have already held that the thirteenth amendment affords an adequate constitutional foundation for the "blockbusting" provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968. See United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d
115 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969); Brown
v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
51. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
52. 482 F.2d at 615-16. It will be remembered that the plaintiffs in Clark presented
evidence that the defendants were engaging in traditional discrimination as defined by
the Love court. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
53. Id.
54. Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1969).

Vol. 1975:7811

HOUSING AND SECTION 1982

owns subdivisions in both markets subjects himself to statutory liability
only if he restricts the access of black or white buyers to either subdivision or encourages particular buyers to purchase housing in one or the
other subdivision with a view to hastening that subdivision's inclusion
in one or the other of the racially defined markets. Before discussing
the wisdom of limiting the availability of relief under section 1982 to
instances of traditional discrimination, however, it is important to confront a final problem which is created by both the Seventh and the
Fifth Circuits' interpretations of the statute-that of formulating a fair
and workable remedy.
Remedial Problems Under Clark and Love
Due to the multitude of individual factors that would bear upon
the reformation of a given plaintiff's contract,5 5 discussion must center
on rather rudimentary computations of actual damages. The initial
computation of damages under either the Clark or Love theory of liability would be relatively simple. The plaintiff would be entitled to
recover the difference between the price5 6 he agreed to pay and the
terms upon which he agreed to pay it and the prices and terms imposed
upon economically similarly situated buyers of comparable housing5"
in the white market during the same period. 58 There is no denying
that difficulties could arise in proving the components of even this formula. However, they pale in comparison to the problems which
are likely to be encountered by courts when they attempt to find a
means by which successful plaintiffs and all subsequent purchasers of
the property in- question can be prevented from reselling the property
at the black market price and themselves realizing an unlawfully high
profit through the dual market system. Plainly it would subvert the
55. According to the Clark opinion, "[tihe statute does not mandate that blacks are
to be sold houses at the exact same price and upon the exact same terms as are available
to white citizens. Reasonable differentials due to a myriad of permissible factors can
be expected and are acceptable." 501 F.2d at 333.
56. In practice, the computation of "price" would take into account the transactional
costs which accompany both deed-mortgage and installment sales transactions. For an
interesting comparison of transactional costs as between these two types of transactions,
see Mixon, Installment Land Contracts: A Study of Low Income Transactions, With
Proposals For Reform and a New Program to Provide Home Ownership in the Inner
City, 7 HousToN L. REv. 523, 529-35 (1970).
57. The Clark court indicated that similarity of "communal amenities such as transportation, schools, churches, and quality of neighborhood" should be considered in determining whether particular residential units in the black and white markets are comparable. 501 F.2d at 335.
58. Although the procedural posture of Clark did not necessitate a discussion of
remedies, the opinion does not foreclose an award of damages computed according to
this formula. See id. at 333.
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court's decision if the original plaintiffs in a Clark-Love type suit were
allowed to reap the profit which their vendors had been forced to relinquish, and the same unfairness would result when any subsequent
owner of the property sold at the black market price. While the original Clark-Love plaintiffs could be enjoined from reselling at an unreasonable price or upon overly burdensome terms,5 9 devising a legal mechanism to prevent exploitative pricing by all subsequent owners would
present great problems.
Two priorities would necessarily weigh heavily in framing a proper remedy. The first, of course, would be the protection of subsequent
buyers from section 1982 violations, whether based upon the Clark or
Love theory of liability. The second would be maintenance of an economic environment in which land can be more or less freely transferred
without undue risk of litigation. Such a fluid market would obviously
favor even black market purchasers by freeing the limited supply of
available housing and encouraging low cost housing developers to build
for the black market. Thus some means of protecting sellers of new
and used residential housing from specious, vexatious litigation would
have to be built into the court's remedy.
Initially, it is clear that subsequent sellers could be sued by their
purchasers or prospective purchasers-black or white-under section
1982. At least one lower court decision, Walker v. Pointer,60 has convincingly reasoned that despite its thirteenth amendment underpinnings, the statute affords relief for even nonblacks who suffer "from
the wrong the amendment was created to cure."61 In cases governed
59. Injunctive relief is available under section 1982. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n.13 (1968).
60. 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
61. Id. at 58. The court cited three reasons for reaching this result: (1) it did
not conflict with Jones; (2) similar fourteenth amendment cases supported it; (3) a contrary result would conflict with the equal protection elements of fifth amendment due
process. Id.
The last argument is by far the most interesting of the three, and the Walker court's
resolution of the problem appears sound in view of the legislative history of section 1982
and as a matter of harmonizing potentially contradictory constitutional provisions. The
issue is whether the statute's thirteenth amendment origin prohibits all citizens except
blacks (or, arguably, members of other minority groups who were oppressed to the point
of slavery) from suing for its violation, and whether this limitation conflicts with notions of equal protection. The source of this equal protection component would not be
the fourteenth amendment, which is directed solely at the states, but the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, which has been held to incorporate the equal protection
standard. Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). However, in order to simplify
discussion, equal protection will be considered as at least "emanating from" the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court has attached significance to the fact that the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, the statute from which section 1982 derives, and the joint resolution which later
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by the legal rules propounded in Clark or Love this principle presumably would support invocation of the statute by white purchasers against
black sellers in that the latter would be feeding off the racially tainted
dual market system to the same extent as white sellers.
The general availability of the statute against subsequent sellers
does not, however, of itself offer a great deal of protection to future
buyers. As individuals, many of them could not be expected to bear
the cost of initiating original actions against their immediate sellers.
The class action device would be of limited utility for two reasons.

First, in most cases there would not be a common seller, or group of
sellers, who could be sued on the basis of a more or less uniform course
of dealing with a large number of buyers; every individual who bought

from the owner of a home in a subdivision, for example, would necessarily have to make out his claim on the facts of the isolated transac-

tion between his seller and himself. This might well prevent the class
members from satisfying the requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that common legal and factual ques-

tions predominate over those "affecting only individual members.

'2

Secondly, in order for the suit to be economical, home buyers who be-

lieved they had been overcharged might have to wait a number of years
to find a sufficiently large number of other persons willing to bear the
became the fourteenth amendment were enacted during the same session of Congress,
see Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31-33 (1948), and it has also been noted that the 1866
Act was re-enacted in 1870 pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, see Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439-40 n.11 (1973). The conclusion to
be drawn is that the statute almost inevitably incorporates equal protection concepts derived from the fourteenth amendment. Even assuming, however, that the statute's thirteenth amendment origins would be deemed controlling, the two amendments should, if
possible, be construed harmoniously so as to give effect to the provisions of both. Cf.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393 (1821). It would appear that recognizing the right of nonblack to sue for thirteenth amendment violations would do no
violence to the amendment's policy of eliminating all "badges and incidents" of slavery.
This is certainly the best argument in favor of the result in Walker. And indeed, it
may be the only means of reconciling the two amendments, unless the courts found the
thirteenth amendment policy of removing the former effects of slavery an "overriding
justification" sufficient under the fourteenth to outweigh disparate treatment of parties
similarly situated. Compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964), with De
Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 331-44 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also
Note, The New Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at 1294, 1318 (1969).
Finally, even if one were forced to conclude that the amendments were irreconcilable, the policy of the fourteenth (incorporated into the fifth) should prevail because
the fourteenth was ratified after the thirteenth and as such constitutes the latest expression of Congress. The argument would not be entirely without difficulty, however,
in view of the rule of construction favoring specific provisions over general ones.
62. FED. R. Cry. P. 23(b) (3). It is unlikely that most groups of aggrieved home
buyers could prosecute class suits pursuant to subdivisions (1) or (2) of subsection (b).
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expense of joining them in a class action, thus giving rise to statute of

limitations complications. 6" Therefore, the bulk of the responsibility
for protecting the rights of buyers subsequent to the plaintiffs in the
original Clark-Love type suit would fall upon the district court which
adjudicated that suit.
The first remedial alternative likely to be considered is one commonplace in civil rights litigation: retention of equitable jurisdiction
over the property in question for the indeterminate future. While this
would reduce the start-up costs of litigation which would normally be
borne by subsequent buyers who in good faith believed themselves to
have been victimized by their sellers, it could operate as an invitation
to subsequent buyers who did not make the bargains they desired to
rush into federal court for an adjustment of their prices and terms of
purchase. Regardless of their chances of success, the bare possibility
that they might bring such actions could have a chilling effect upon
an otherwise relatively unrestricted market in residential housing.
A more suitable remedy, one which could reduce the potential for
market-restricting litigation while still deterring exploitative pricing,
can be formulated from the model of the common law covenant running with the land. The common law concept would have to be modi-

fied in ways not currently recognized under the laws of most states in
order for it to have real utility as a remedy in suits like Clark and
Love.6 4 However, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park65 the Supreme
Court interpreted section three of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,66 now
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1988,7 as authorization for courts granting re-

lief under section 1982 to look to both federal and state law in fash63. See Baker v. F & F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821
(1970). The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling in the Contract Buyers
League cases that the respective plaintiff classes had to be redefined to exclude home
owners whose installment purchase contracts had terminated more than five years before the actions were initiated.
64. See notes 73-76 infra and accompanying text.
65. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
66. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
67. The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall
be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States,
so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases
where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of
the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause
is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the
trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
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ioning federal common law remedies which best serve the policy of the
statute0 8 The only limitation the statute places upon the use or formulation of federal common law in shaping remedies under section 1982
is its proviso that the common law applied not conflict with the constitution or statutes of the state where the particular district court sits.6 9 It
can be argued that imposing a real covenant regulating the price of
land amounts to more than the utilization of an orthodox judicial remedy. Nevertheless, nothing in the statute implies that a legal device
which has been employed in relatively limited circumstances under state
or the general common law, such as the real covenant, cannot be utilized to provide the fullest possible relief in section 1982 actions.7 °
A brief comparison of the basic covenant which would be required
to protect subsequent purchasers in Clark-Love type cases with the
prevailing law on covenants running with the land reveals a number
of significant discrepancies. The necessary components of a covenant
of the type contemplated would be (1) a promise by the buyer of the
land not to resell upon more onerous terms than those currently imposed upon economically similarly situated buyers of comparable housing in the white market, and (2) some mechanism for conveying the
amount of any unreasonable differential imposed from the offending
seller to the victimized buyer.
At the outset it should be noted that characterizing the covenant
as a third-party beneficiary contract made between the parties to the
original suit in favor of all subsequent buyers of the property in question would be of limited utility once the property passed beyond the
first subsequent buyer. The lack of an identifiable beneficiary at the
time the covenant was made would not invalidate the contract; 71 however, before a subsequent buyer from any of the original co-plaintiffs
could be bound by the promise not to overcharge future buyers, that
subsequent buyer would himself have to assume the promise, either
expressly or impliedly. The mere purchase of the property probably
68. 396 U.S. at 240. See Note, Contract Buyers 537-39. The author postulates that
the "common law" which section 1988 allows to be incorporated into civil rights remedies is the federal or general common law promulgated by the federal judiciary during
the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). This interpretation of the statute would
allow modem courts to disregard state decisional law which frustrates the purpose of
section 1982. See Note, Contract Buyers 543-45.
69. See note 67 supra.
70. For an expansive interpretation of the term "remedies" as used in section 1988,
see Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1961). It should be noted, however,
that section 1988 is of no avail to plaintiffs who seek to import into federal law entire
state law causes of action. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 703-04
(1973).
71. See 4 A. CoRBIN, CoRIN ON CoNmRACs § 781 (1951).
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would not operate as such an assumption.7 2 Therefore, in most cases
the duty not to overcharge would fall only upon the original co-plaintiffs.
The first and greatest difficulty with the contemplated covenant
is that it would constitute a direct restraint upon alienation, usually void
under the general common law and the statutes of most of the states. 73
The argument in defense would be that since section 1988 allows
courts to combine state, federal, and general common law to effectuate
the purposes of the civil rights laws, the authority of section 1982, and
inferentially the thirteenth amendment, should take precedence over
firmly entrenched state policy in the process for formulating a proper
remedy. Assuming arguendo that this argument would prevail and
that the polidy against direct restraints was not embodied in either the
constitution or statutes of the state where the rendering court was located, 74 the next task would be to construct an effective covenant which
at least nominally satisfied the four generally recognized characteristics
of a valid real covenant: (1) that it be in writing; (2) that the parties
intend that it run with the land; (3) that the promise "touch or concern" the land; and (4) that privity of estate exist between the parties
thereto.751
The prototypal covenant running with a fee simple is created
when a seller, desiring to secure some benefit for himself and future
owners of the remainder of a large tract from which the property in
question is being sold, exacts as part of the consideration for the sale
a promise from the buyer that he, his heirs and assigns, will do or refrain from doing specified acts with respect to the property purchased.
The burden of the covenant runs with the property purchased and the
benefit runs with the property retained. Such a covenant generally
"touches and concerns" both the benefited and burdened estates, and
72. Compare Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d
832, 196 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1959), with 4 A. CoRniN, supra note 71, § 808 (1951), discussing Maher v. Cleveland Union Stock Yards Co., 55 Ohio App. 412, 9 N.E.2d 995
(1936). See also REsTATEmENT OF PROPERTY § 541, comment c (1944).
73. See, e.g., Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 P. 451 (1887); Kershner v.
Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955); De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467 (1852); Dunlop v. Dunlop's Ex'rs, 144 Va. 297, 132 S.E. 351 (1926). See generally 6 R. POWELL,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY jI 842, at 13 (1958), noting that although restraints which
require sharing of the proceeds of land do not forbid alienation entirely, they are generally held void because they are "bound to create hesitancy in selling. .... "
74. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
75. See C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND Ona RrINTERm WHicH "RUN WmTH
LAND" 94 (2d ed. 1947).
It is important to note that while Judge Clark himself did
not agree with the characterization of "privity" included in the text, i.e., as between the
parties to the covenant, he admitted that "if mere frequency of judicial statement is to
govern, it. . . would seem to be the current rule of law." Id. at 116.
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privity of estate exists between buyer and seller because the burdened
estate is carved out of the benefited one.
A covenant of the type contemplated here would deviate from this

model in that the real benefit of the buyer's promise would run not
to the seller, the other party to the covenant, but to an unidentified
subsequent buyer. Furthermore, both benefit and burden seemingly
would be assumed by each subsequent buyer at the date of purchase;

ownership would confer upon him the present "benefit" of having a
potential claim for overcharge against his seller, but would also impose
the latent "burden" of having to account for such an overcharge to his

subsequent buyer after divesting himself of ownership.

In sum, a

covenant which purported to operate in this "leapfrog" fashion would
be so far outside conventional concepts of real covenants 70 as to amount
76. The Restatement of Property does not sanction "running benefits" where the
promise does not benefit the owner of the land in his "use" of it. RESTATEMENT OF
PROPRTY § 543(1) (1944). An owner's claim for reimbursement of a portion of an
excessive purchase price does not respect his "use" of the land as that term is defined
by the Restatement. Id. § 543(2) & comment. Neither does the Restatement contemplate covenants in gross, i.e., covenants under which both the benefit and the burden
do not attach to and run with separate, concurrently owned pieces of realty. See id.
§§ 535, 537 & comments a, h,547.
Judge Clark is more liberal. He cites with approval cases where the running benefit
was the right to receive cash payments which rendered the owner's legal interest in the
property more valuable. See C. CLARK, supra note 75, at 97, 99-100 & nn. 19, 20. He
also sees no reason to disallow covenants where either the burden or benefit are in gross.
Id. at 106-07. None of the cases he cites, however, involved successive assumption of
the benefit and the burden of a covenant by the same party, determined by his term
of ownership of the property involved, and it is unlikely that a covenant of the type
contemplated would be approved.
However, a rather circuitous mechanism can be envisioned which would be more
consistent with conventional theory and yet yield the desired result. Incontrast to the
"leapfrog" covenant described in the text, the covenant could be drafted so that the
"benefit" of having a claim for overcharge would be retained by one person and the
"burden" of having to resell the property at a reasonable price passed along to each successive buyer during his term of ownership. The permanent beneficiary would be the
original seller of the property, i.e., the party to whom the plaintiff buyer in the ClarkLove type suit made the promise to resell upon reasonable terms.
This procedure would come much closer to satisfying the traditional requirements
for real covenants than the "leapfrog" method. Despite the fact that a burden of this
type would not concern the owner's "use" of his land as required by the Restatement,
see RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 & comment b (1944), at least one noted commentator has stated that a running burden need do no more than render the owner's
legal interest in the property "less valuable." See C. CLARK, supra note 75, at 97; accord, 165 Broadway Bldg., Inc. v. City Investing Co., 120 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 682 (1941). That requirement would be met if the covenant were drafted
so as to bind each successive owner while he owned the land by forbidding him to contract for its resale at unreasonable terms. Similarly, keeping the benefit in the original
seller rather than attempting to pass it down the chain of prospective buyers could be
advantageous. Such a covenant in gross, in which the benefit does not accrue as a re-
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to a judicially imposed-rather than a hybrid-remedy constructad
from federal, state, and common law.
The seriousness of the remedial problems lurking in Clark-Lovetype actions can only reflect negatively upon the substantive legal
standards which engendered them. The greater the extent to which
conventional doctrine must be stretched in order to provide a thoroughgoing remedy, the greater becomes the suspicion that the responsibility
for formulating that remedy properly rests with the legislature. Yet
a modified covenant running with the land may be the only mechanism
which satisfactorily reconciles the competing priorities of section 1982
and of maintaining a relatively fluid housing market. The prospective
buyer of property encumbered by a section 1982 covenant probably
would have less reason to concern himself over the possibility of having
to defend a frivolous suit upon resale than if the district court which
rendered judgment in the initial Clark-Love-type suit retained jurisdiction over the property, since a disappointed subsequent buyer might
well be unwilling to bear the expense of initiating suit if his claim were
not bona fide. On the other hand, an individual interested in acquiring
the property could not ignore the fact that the language of the covenant not only would alert a subsequent buyer to his statutory rights but
also, in effect, state his potential claim before his eyes. The covenant
could encourage self-regulatory conduct by sellers in setting their terms
without creating a counterproductive "chilling effect" upon the residential housing market. If the imposition of liability in the first instance
under the rules of law stated in Clark and Love is to be defended at
all, it must be bolstered by some remedial device similar to the proposed section 1982 covenant.
It appears, then, that the traditional theory of discrimination embodies the correct standard of liability under section 1982. In cases
like Clark and Love it would embrace any course of dealing through
which prospective buyers in the same market were treated unequally.
sult of present ownership of a piece of realty, has been approved by Judge Clark. The
Restatement is contra.

Assuming that this basic covenant would be validated, the obvious next step would
be to devise a means by which any differential theoretically recoverable thereunder could
be transferred from the original seller to the party aggrieved, the subsequent buyer. One
solution would be to attach to the covenant a counter-promise by the original seller to
the original buyer that the seller would enforce the covenant and pay any amounts received thereunder from any of the buyer's successors in interest to the victim of the proscribed overcharge as a third party donee beneficiary. The contract would be valid despite the lack of a presently identifiable beneficiary. See note 71 supra and accompanying text. Suit on the contract, and thereby on the covenant, could be initiated by any
aggrieved buyer. See A. CoaiN, supra note 71, § 810 (1951).
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It would not support either the Clark "perpetuation of segregation"
standard nor the quasi-traditional theory advanced in Love. Of course,
adopting an analytical approach which denies recovery for activities

which exact an exorbitant profit from the prevailing dual market system
does not make those activities any more palatable.77

Nevertheless,

state law sanctions may be available when a developer's conduct approaches overreaching or outright fraud.78 Furthermore, the suggested analysis in no way diminishes the potency of section 1982 for
dealing with activities which foster further development of residential
segregation.
Under the traditional theory, statutory liability will extend to most
situations in which builders or other sellers of real property, through
their conduct toward prospective buyers, attempt to shape to their own
ends the racial composition of the neighborhoods in which the properties are located. Proscribed activities would of course include direct

and indirect refusals to deal on racial grounds.7 9 However, liability
could also be predicated upon conduct toward buyers which is aimed
at "guiding" newly constructed housing into one or the other of the
racially delineated housing markets.8 0 It is clear, for example, that
77. As stated by the trial judge in Clark, "counsel for the plaintiffs have not painted
a pretty picture of the defendants, but that picture is a picture of exploitation for profit,
and not racial discrimination." Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 327
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3349 (Dec. 16, 1974).
78. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
79. In covering such refusals to deal, section 1982 would overlap section 804 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970). However, section 1982's utility
remains even in fact situations governed by the 1968 Act since actions under the latter
are limited by the "private home" exemption of section 803, id. § 3603(b) (1970), and
the short 180 day limitations period imposed by sections 810(b) and 812(a), id. §§
3610(b), 3612(a) (1970). Federal courts have held that section 1982 operates independently of both the section 803 exemption, see Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151, 161
(N.D. Ohio 1969), and the limitations provisions, see Hickman v. Fincher, 483 F.2d
855 (4th Cir. 1973).
80. The market toward which a seller might be tempted to "guide" new housing
units would be determined largely by the location and quality of the housing, and thus
by the class of persons economically situated to purchase it. For example, the developer
of a large subdivision of inexpensive homes in a racially mixed section of a city could
decide to boost his profit by injecting all or most of the subdivision into the undersupplied black housing market; therefore, he would be likely to discourage prospective white
buyers with gratuitous and perjorative statements (not made to prospective black buyers)
that the subdivision had already attracted a large number of blacks and would probably
be "taken over" within a few years. In contrast, the builder of expensive homes who
did not want to lose prospective white purchasers because of the presence of black homeowners could fortify his position in the white market by volunteering to prospective
black buyers information about the racial hostility felt by present and probable future
white homeowners. For a discussion of the utility of the traditional theory of racial
discrimination in distinguishing between this type of conduct and objective assessments
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when the motive behind a seller's representations or other conduct toward his buyers is to place the housing in question in one of the racially
distinct housing markets, those representations will almost of necessity
vary as between buyers of different races.

Such disparate treatment

of parties similarly situated-in this case, black and white prospective
buyers of the same residential unit-would constitute racial discrimina-

tion in the traditional sense and thus violate section 1982.
On the other hand, if a seller's respresentations concerning a subdivision's present or probable future racial composition do not vary
qualitatively 8l as between members of different races, his conduct
should not be actionable under the statute. Sellers, therefore, could
make objective assessments of the racial and economic characteristics
of particular neighborhoods," and buyers would remain free to indulge

their own racial prejudices in acting upon such representation. In
sum, development of residential patterns based on race which does
not result from sellers' disparate treatment of buyers because of race
3
would not be disturbed.8
made by sellers to buyers concerning the racial and economic makeup of neighborhoods,
see notes 81-82 infra and accompanying text.
There is no authority for imposing section 1982 liability upon real property sellers
who attempt to "guide" residential units in the manner described, either individually or
en masse. However, the district court in Contract Buyers League by implication held
that the "blockbusting" technique, through which some of the defendant-purchasers were
alleged to have obtained at unduly low prices residences which were subsequently resold
to the plaintiffs, would violate section 1982. A glance reveals that "blockbusting" is the
converse of "neighborhood shaping"-the blockbuster makes race-related representations
to sellers in order to depress the price at which they will sell, while the "neighborhood
shaper" makes such representations to buyers with a view to placing the housing unit
in either the black or white market and thereby increasing the prices he will be able
to extract from buyers. "Blockbusting" for profit is now expressly prohibited by section
804(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970).
81. It is obvious that the measure of "variation" between statements made to black
and white purchasers could be minimal or nonexistent, and yet a seller could still be
motivated by a discriminatory animus aimed at shaping a neighborhood's racial composition for his own profit. However, in cases where evidence outside of the substantive
content of the seller's representations suggest an intent to "shape a neighborhood," courts
could hold him to a standard of minimal variation between representations made to buyers of different races in order to bring the traditional theory of discrimination and section 1982 into play.
82. Cf. United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969), holding
that section 804(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970), does
not proscribe honest answers made by real estate brokers in response to owners' questions concerning the racial composition of their neighborhoods. But cf. Brown v. State
Realty, 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1969). See generally Note, Blockbusting,
59 GEO. L.J. 170, 186-87 (1970).
83. Since particular emphasis has been placed upon the remedial difficulties likely
to be encountered under the Clark and Love constructions of section 1982, a short discussion of the types of relief available under the traditional theory is in order. In ases
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Conclusions and Alternatives to Extending Section 1982 Beyond
Traditional Concepts of RacialDiscrimination
It has been the thesis of this Note that the courts which decided
the Clark and Love cases constructed rules of law which extend section
1982 liability too far, and that their lack of moderation will be evidenced by the difficulties they are bound to encounter in attempting
to frame suitable remedies. However, none of the foregoing commentary has been intended to minimize the inequity or severity of the situations with which the plaintiffs in Clark and Love were faced. Though
it has been recommended that section 1982 be construed to forbid
instances of traditional racial discrimination only, it has also been expressly assumed that the traditional theory encompasses most if not all
activities which foster the extension of the dual market system,8 4 ranging from blatant or subtle refusals to deal to conduct aimed at "shaping" the racial composition of neighborhoods for profit. Some comfort
can be drawn both from the fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1968, in
conjunction with section 1982, conceivably could be invoked against
parties as diverse as individual sellers of homes and large savings and
loan institutions, and that the statutes' utility has been increased by
judicial recognition of nonblacks as proper plaintiffs under both.s
of racially motivated refusals to deal, the usual remedy would be a permanent injunction
against the acts which violated section 1982. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). See
note 59 supra. Framing proper remedies against the "neighborhood shaping" seller
would be more difficult in that he may already have induced or discouraged a sufficient
number of purchases in the neighborhood to place it in one or the other of the housing
markets. A permanent injunction forbidding the seller from attempting to shape neighborhoods in the future would be helpful, but could not afford relief to many aggrieved
persons, e.g., black buyers who shopped in the white market but eventually bought in
the black market because a white-market seller's statements convinced them that they
could not realistically live in the homes he was selling due to racially prejudiced white
neighbors. See note 80 supra. For these litigants relief would have to come through
money damages and/or reformation of the installment contracts under which they had
purchased. The computation of damages would necessarily entail a determination of the
difference between black and white market prices. The difficulty of presenting evidence
from which black and white market prices and terms could be established might be great.
However, some measure of imprecision would seem acceptable in the course of vindicating the fundamental rights secured by section 1982. Unlike the serious remedial infirmities, which accompany both the Clark and Love interpretations of the statute, imprecision on this scale would not constitute grounds for calling into question the validity of
the entire traditional theory of liability.
84. For an explanation of the near impossibility of direct suits by homeowners in
the position of the plaintiffs in Clark and Love against the flock of individuals and/or
institutions which conceivably contributed toward creating the existing dual market system, see Note, ContractBuyers 526-30.
85. The relevant decision under section 1982 is Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56
(N.D. Tex. 1969). See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text. With respect to sec-

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1975:781

Nevertheless, the large number of private and governmental entities
which incrementally contribute to the extension of the dual market
system over relatively long periods of time may make it impossible for even a diverse class of plaintiffs to obtain adequate relief6
against the numerous entities contributing to the discriminatory action.
Furthermore, the Government has largely confined its enforcement activities under section 813 of the Civil Rights Act of 19687 to instances
of discrimination by the immediate vendors of residential units, 8 leaving
undisturbed the activities of financial institutions and government
agencies. Finally, the advisability of attempting to force residential
integration upon the races is open to question. One commentator has
been at least partly correct in arguing that both state and federal fair
housing statutes, aside from being incomplete in coverage and weak
in enforcement measures, take the wrong approach to -the problem
of middle class resistance to residential integration by attempting
to coerce the white community into compliance."9 Similarly, the reluctance of some black families to move into predominantly white neighborhoods because they prefer to live with members of their own race,
and the probability that this reluctance perpetuates and spreads the
dual market system, cannot be ignored.90
The conclusions to be drawn from this are threefold. First, attempts to extend the dual market system can and should be attacked
by private litigants or the Government under section 1982 or the 1968
Civil Rights Act; second, to the extent these statutory remedies are inadequate to the task, Congress and the state legislatures should improve
their effectiveness; and third, since section 1982, properly construed,
is not a proper tool for attacking the existing dual market system, Congress and the state legislatures should take steps to abolish the existing
system or to make its effects less onerous. The most productive solutions to problems encountered by black market home buyers may be
those which aim at softening the detrimental effects of the dual market
structure, rather than attempting to eliminate it altogether.
A number of legislative and judicial remedies capable of rendering
tion 810(a) of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970), see Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
86. See Silverman, supra note 41, at 78-97.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
88. See, e.g., United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir.
1971) (apartment operators); United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130 (M.D. Fla.
1972) (mobile home park operators); United States v. Luebke, 345 F. Supp. 179 (D.
Colo. 1972) (realtors).
89. See Silverman, supra note 41, at 97-100.
90. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
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the status quo more bearable are currently available at both the state
and federal levels. It is significant that none of them directly attacks
the dollar differential in prices and terms between black and white mar-

kets. State law actions based on fraud br unconscionability, for example, erect standards of permissible conduct by sellers in commercial
transactions. However, the fact that many state courts do not allow
the invocation of fraud or unconscionability except in relatively limited

and extreme circumstances 9' may render these common law causes of
action too inflexible to be genuinely effective against the more covert

and subtle sales techniques practiced by some sellers of residential
property. More promising are those state statutory provisions aimed
at "civilizing" the easily abused installment land contract.92 If more
states adopted regulations similar to these, low income families could
utilize the installment contract method of purchase, which eliminates

many of the transactional costs accompanying deed-mortgage purchases, 93 without undue fear of exploitation.

Of course, the most direct means by which poor families can overcome the vicissitudes of the dual market is for the state or federal government to partly or wholly subsidize their home purchases. Congress
provided such a program through section 235 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 91 which authorizes the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HU]D)to insure mortgages and "to
make interest-assistance payments on behalf of the purchaser directly
to his mortgagee." 9 5 State or federal direct subsidy programs may
prove to be the most popular legislative response to the actual price
effects of the dual market, since legislatures may feel that they should
91. An astonishing illustration of the types of conduct which does not give rise to
claims for fraud or unconscionability under Illinois law may be found in Contract Buyers League. See 300 F. Supp. at 225-28. One commentator offers as his central thesis
the view that the courts should adopt a standard of "racial unconscionability" extending
beyond traditional notions of discriminatory conduct when dealing with cases like Clark
and Love. See Note, Contract Buyers.
92. One commentator, noting with general approval the regulatory schemes adopted
by Maryland and California, has suggested that tight controls be applied to a number
of nonprice contract terms. See Mixon, supra note 56, at 565-74. These controls include mandatory contract terms designed to protect the installment purchaser's accrued
equity from his seller's mortgage creditors-terms providing for equal monthly payments
(eliminating so-called "balloon notes") and delivery of a deed upon the payment of a
given percentage of the purchase price. Id. at 568-74.
93. See id. at 526-35.
94. 12 U.S.C. § 1715(z) (1970).
95. Silverman, supra note 41, at 73. Although the program has been criticized as
perpetuating residential segregation, see id. at 82-97, and has not been operated so as
to benefit "the abject poor," available data indicates that substantial numbers of black
families have taken advantage of it prior to January 5, 1973, the date of a Presidential
moratorium upon any additional funding for the program. Id. at 72, 77-80.
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not tamper with the central element of any market system, price, even
though the system has been distorted by discriminatory conduct, but
rather should content themselves with ameliorating the system's socially
undesirable effects.
In any event, whatever the character of Congress' and the state
legislatures' responses to the hardships created by the dual market system, it is difficult to refute the view that the responsibility for eliminating its price effects lies with them rather than the courts. Undoubtedly,
the broad language of the thirteenth amendment can be read to authorize an extension of the coverage of its implementing statutes, including
section 1982, to the discriminatory pricing activities challenged in Clark
and Love; the amendment's abolition of the "badges and incidents of
slavery" has already been utilized by Congress in section 804(s) of the
1968 Civil Rights Act9 6 to proscribe conduct which does not constitute
traditional racial discrimination. 97 But for the courts to divine a congressional intention to forbid nontraditional acts of discrimination in a
statute passed over a century ago, particularly where such a determination is likely to have unpredictable and far-reaching economic repercussions, appears to be ill-advised, notwithstanding the sympathetic positions of particular plaintiffs. The unavoidable remedial problems
which would arise further inveigh against the wisdom of such an expansion of the scope of section 1982. The better approach for both
the Seventh and Fifth Circuits would have been to formulate rules of
law which adhered faithfully to the traditional theory of racial discrimiation, leaving to Congress and the state legislatures the elimination of
the inequities which plaintiffs in Clark and Love brought before the
public eye.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970).
97. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.

